Logical mechanism design

Iyad Rahwan; Kate Larson; Iyad Rahwan; Kate Larson

doi:10.1017/S0269888910000421

2011 Volume 26

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RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access

Logical mechanism design

Iyad Rahwan^1,2,,
Kate Larson^3,

1.
Computing & Information Science Program
2.
The Media Lab
3.
Cheriton School of Computer Science

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Corresponding authors: Iyad Rahwan ; Kate Larson

Published online: 07 February 2011
The Knowledge Engineering Review 26, Article number: 10.1017/S0269888910000421 (2011) | Cite this article

Abstract

Abstract: Game theory is becoming central to the design and analysis of computational mechanisms in which multiple entities interact strategically. The tools of mechanism design are used extensively to engineer incentives for truth revelation into resource allocation (e.g. combinatorial auctions) and preference aggregation protocols (e.g. voting). We argue that mechanism design can also be useful in the design of logical inference procedures. In particular, it can help us understand and engineer inference procedures when knowledge is distributed among self-interested agents. We set a research agenda for this emerging area, and point to some early research efforts.
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Iyad Rahwan, Kate Larson. 2011. Logical mechanism design. The Knowledge Engineering Review. 26:421 doi: 10.1017/S0269888910000421

Iyad Rahwan, Kate Larson. 2011. Logical mechanism design. The Knowledge Engineering Review. 26:421 doi: 10.1017/S0269888910000421

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Logical mechanism design

Iyad Rahwan^1,2,,
Kate Larson^3,

1.
Computing & Information Science Program
2.
The Media Lab
3.
Cheriton School of Computer Science

Corresponding authors: Iyad Rahwan ; Kate Larson

Published online: 07 February 2011

The Knowledge Engineering Review 26, Article number: 10.1017/S0269888910000421 (2011) | Cite this article

Abstract: Abstract: Game theory is becoming central to the design and analysis of computational mechanisms in which multiple entities interact strategically. The tools of mechanism design are used extensively to engineer incentives for truth revelation into resource allocation (e.g. combinatorial auctions) and preference aggregation protocols (e.g. voting). We argue that mechanism design can also be useful in the design of logical inference procedures. In particular, it can help us understand and engineer inference procedures when knowledge is distributed among self-interested agents. We set a research agenda for this emerging area, and point to some early research efforts.

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Note that one can easily define a qualified version of this condition, requiring ⊨ to be proof-theoretic implementable for a class of agent preferences or a restricted strategy space.

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Cite this article

Iyad Rahwan, Kate Larson. 2011. Logical mechanism design. The Knowledge Engineering Review. 26:421 doi: 10.1017/S0269888910000421

Iyad Rahwan, Kate Larson. 2011. Logical mechanism design. The Knowledge Engineering Review. 26:421 doi: 10.1017/S0269888910000421

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Logical mechanism design

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