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2016 Volume 31
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RESEARCH ARTICLE   Open Access    

Classifying sanctions and designing a conceptual sanctioning process model for socio-technical systems

  • 1.

    Computer Engineering Department

  • 2.

    00185 Rome

  • 3.

    Centre for Research in Social Simulation

  • 4.

    Department of Computer Science

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  • Abstract: We understand a socio-technical system (STS) as a cyber-physical system in which two or more autonomous parties interact via or about technical elements, including the parties’ resources and actions. As information technology begins to pervade every corner of human life, STSs are becoming ever more common, and the challenge of governing STSs is becoming increasingly important. We advocate a normative basis for governance, wherein norms represent the standards of correct behaviour that each party in an STS expects from others. A major benefit of focussing on norms is that they provide a socially realistic view of interaction among autonomous parties that abstracts low-level implementation details. Overlaid on norms is the notion of a sanction as a negative or positive reaction to potentially any violation of or compliance with an expectation. Although norms have been well studied as regards governance for STSs, sanctions have not. Our understanding and usage of norms is inadequate for the purposes of governance unless we incorporate a comprehensive representation of sanctions.We address the aforementioned gap by proposing (i) a sanction typology that reflects the relevant features of sanctions, and (ii) a conceptual sanctioning process model providing a functional structure for sanctioning in STS. We demonstrate our contributions via a motivating scenario from the domain of renewable energy trading.
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  • Cite this article

    Luis G. Nardin, Tina Balke-Visser, Nirav Ajmeri, Anup K. Kalia, Jaime S. Sichman, Munindar P. Singh. 2016. Classifying sanctions and designing a conceptual sanctioning process model for socio-technical systems. The Knowledge Engineering Review 31(2)142−166, doi: 10.1017/S0269888916000023
    Luis G. Nardin, Tina Balke-Visser, Nirav Ajmeri, Anup K. Kalia, Jaime S. Sichman, Munindar P. Singh. 2016. Classifying sanctions and designing a conceptual sanctioning process model for socio-technical systems. The Knowledge Engineering Review 31(2)142−166, doi: 10.1017/S0269888916000023
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RESEARCH ARTICLE   Open Access    

Classifying sanctions and designing a conceptual sanctioning process model for socio-technical systems

  • 1.

    Computer Engineering Department

  • 2.

    00185 Rome

  • 3.

    Centre for Research in Social Simulation

  • 4.

    Department of Computer Science

  • Published online: 17 March 2016
The Knowledge Engineering Review  31,  2016, 31(2): 142−166  |  Cite this article

Abstract: Abstract: We understand a socio-technical system (STS) as a cyber-physical system in which two or more autonomous parties interact via or about technical elements, including the parties’ resources and actions. As information technology begins to pervade every corner of human life, STSs are becoming ever more common, and the challenge of governing STSs is becoming increasingly important. We advocate a normative basis for governance, wherein norms represent the standards of correct behaviour that each party in an STS expects from others. A major benefit of focussing on norms is that they provide a socially realistic view of interaction among autonomous parties that abstracts low-level implementation details. Overlaid on norms is the notion of a sanction as a negative or positive reaction to potentially any violation of or compliance with an expectation. Although norms have been well studied as regards governance for STSs, sanctions have not. Our understanding and usage of norms is inadequate for the purposes of governance unless we incorporate a comprehensive representation of sanctions.We address the aforementioned gap by proposing (i) a sanction typology that reflects the relevant features of sanctions, and (ii) a conceptual sanctioning process model providing a functional structure for sanctioning in STS. We demonstrate our contributions via a motivating scenario from the domain of renewable energy trading.

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    Acknowledgments

    • This work was partially supported by the University Global Partnership Network, a collaboration among North Carolina State University, University of São Paulo, and University of Surrey. L. G. Nardin was partially funded by the European Union Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement no. 315874. T. Balke-Visser was partially funded by the European Union Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement no. 288147 as well as by the EPSRC-funded Whole Systems Energy Modelling Consortium (wholeSEM). N. Ajmeri and M. P. Singh were partially supported by the US Department of Defense under the Science of Security Lablet grant. J. S. Sichman was partially supported by CNPq, Brazil, under grant agreement no. 303950/2013-7.

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    Luis G. Nardin, Tina Balke-Visser, Nirav Ajmeri, Anup K. Kalia, Jaime S. Sichman, Munindar P. Singh. 2016. Classifying sanctions and designing a conceptual sanctioning process model for socio-technical systems. The Knowledge Engineering Review 31(2)142−166, doi: 10.1017/S0269888916000023
    Luis G. Nardin, Tina Balke-Visser, Nirav Ajmeri, Anup K. Kalia, Jaime S. Sichman, Munindar P. Singh. 2016. Classifying sanctions and designing a conceptual sanctioning process model for socio-technical systems. The Knowledge Engineering Review 31(2)142−166, doi: 10.1017/S0269888916000023
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