The University of Tulsa, e-mails: sandip@utulsa.edu, chad-crawford@utulsa.edu, apd615@utulsa.edu, rachnanandakumar@utulsa.edu, jah6484@utulsa.edu"/>
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2020 Volume 35
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ORIGINAL RESEARCH   Open Access    

Effects of parity, sympathy and reciprocity in increasing social welfare

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  • Abstract: We are interested in understanding how socially desirable traits like sympathy, reciprocity, and fairness can survive in environments that include aggressive and exploitative agents. Social scientists have long theorized about ingrained motivational factors as explanations for departures from self-seeking behaviors by human subjects. Some of these factors, namely reciprocity, have also been studied extensively in the context of agent systems as tools for promoting cooperation and improving social welfare in stable societies. In this paper, we evaluate how other factors like sympathy and parity can be used by agents to seek out cooperation possibilities while avoiding exploitation traps in more dynamic societies. We evaluate the relative effectiveness of agents influenced by different social considerations when they can change who they interact with in their environment using both an experimental framework and a predictive analysis. Such rewiring of social networks not only allows possibly vulnerable agents to avoid exploitation but also allows them to form gainful coalitions to leverage mutually beneficial cooperation, thereby significantly increasing social welfare.
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  • Cite this article

    Sandip Sen, Chad Crawford, Adam Dees, Rachna Nanda Kumar, James Hale. 2020. Effects of parity, sympathy and reciprocity in increasing social welfare. The Knowledge Engineering Review 35(1), doi: 10.1017/S0269888920000120
    Sandip Sen, Chad Crawford, Adam Dees, Rachna Nanda Kumar, James Hale. 2020. Effects of parity, sympathy and reciprocity in increasing social welfare. The Knowledge Engineering Review 35(1), doi: 10.1017/S0269888920000120
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ORIGINAL RESEARCH   Open Access    

Effects of parity, sympathy and reciprocity in increasing social welfare

  • Received: 22 December 2018
  • Revised: 24 January 2020
  • Accepted: 28 January 2020
  • Published online: 23 June 2020
The Knowledge Engineering Review  35,  2020, 35(1)  |  Cite this article

Abstract: Abstract: We are interested in understanding how socially desirable traits like sympathy, reciprocity, and fairness can survive in environments that include aggressive and exploitative agents. Social scientists have long theorized about ingrained motivational factors as explanations for departures from self-seeking behaviors by human subjects. Some of these factors, namely reciprocity, have also been studied extensively in the context of agent systems as tools for promoting cooperation and improving social welfare in stable societies. In this paper, we evaluate how other factors like sympathy and parity can be used by agents to seek out cooperation possibilities while avoiding exploitation traps in more dynamic societies. We evaluate the relative effectiveness of agents influenced by different social considerations when they can change who they interact with in their environment using both an experimental framework and a predictive analysis. Such rewiring of social networks not only allows possibly vulnerable agents to avoid exploitation but also allows them to form gainful coalitions to leverage mutually beneficial cooperation, thereby significantly increasing social welfare.

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    • In literature, often an altruistic agent is discussed (Krebs, 1970; Taylor, 1992; Badhwar, 1993; Schmitz, 1993; Day & Taylor, 1998), which can be viewed as an extreme case of sympathetic agent which ignores its own payoff and puts the entire weight on the opponent’s payoff when calculating its utility of an outcome, that is, for an altruist, $W_{me}=0$, $W_{s}=1$, and its type is described by the weight vector $\langle 1,0,0,0,-,-\rangle$. The sympathetic agents we use balances selfish considerations with consideration about the well-being of the opponent.

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    Sandip Sen, Chad Crawford, Adam Dees, Rachna Nanda Kumar, James Hale. 2020. Effects of parity, sympathy and reciprocity in increasing social welfare. The Knowledge Engineering Review 35(1), doi: 10.1017/S0269888920000120
    Sandip Sen, Chad Crawford, Adam Dees, Rachna Nanda Kumar, James Hale. 2020. Effects of parity, sympathy and reciprocity in increasing social welfare. The Knowledge Engineering Review 35(1), doi: 10.1017/S0269888920000120
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