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Learning from disasters: the 22/7-terrorism in Norway and COVID-19 through a failure modelling lens

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  • Disasters can have detrimental impacts on lives, reputations, trust, and resources. The aim of this paper is to illustrate how root cause analysis methods can be used to learn from failures in both security and safety domains. Utilising two case studies within the security and safety domains, respectively the 22-7 terrorism and Norway and the COVID-19 pandemic within the UK, we investigate how using a hybrid model approach consisting of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) and Minimum Cut Set Analysis (MCSA), helps identify the causality between failures and the catastrophic events. Results illustrate the benefits of using a hybrid of root cause analysis techniques to extract learning lessons, in order to mitigate against future similar incidents. We applied techniques that can assist organisations to apply the concept of learning from failures in practice. More specifically, the Fault Tree Analysis - for analysing causality, Reliability Block Diagram - for analysing relationships between causal factors, and Minimum Cut Set Analysis - for analysing vulnerable scenarios, were applied to the two cases, demonstrating how these models can aid in their 'de-blackening'.
  • Lignin is one of the most abundant secondary metabolites present in the cell walls of specialized plant cell types in vascular plants[1]. Lignin is an organic polyphenolic polymer that is formed by the polymerization of three monolignols – p-coumaryl alcohol, coniferyl alcohol, and sinapyl alcohol, that produce p-hydroxyphenyl (H), guaiacyl (G), and syringyl (S) subunits, respectively. Gymnosperms lack the S-lignin subunits and have relatively higher lignin content compared to the angiosperm woody species[2]. Lignin provides structural support, transports water and minerals, and protects the plant from pathogens, thereby acting as a barrier[3]. However, lignin forms one of the major hurdles for the forest-based industry e.g. paper, pulp, and biofuel production[4]. For example, lignin negatively affects paper quality where the presence of lignin causes discoloration of the paper and weakens it. The degradation of lignin is difficult as it is a complex polymer, therefore modification or pretreatment of lignin is required to make the wood suitable for biofuel production[5]. Hence, the detailed mechanisms involved in the regulation of lignin synthesis are valuable for the industry. Conifers form the major source of softwood for timber and paper production, and they are especially preferred for pulp because of the long fibers in their wood[6]. Even so, while the lignin biosynthetic pathway is well studied in model plants like Arabidopsis thaliana (Arabidopsis) and other angiosperm woody trees, this research area remains relatively unexplored in gymnosperms.

    The lignin biosynthesis pathway is regulated by a complex network of transcription factors from the MYB (myeloblastosis) family that either positively or negatively controls lignin synthesis[7]. In this review, MYB members were referred to that activate or suppress lignin synthesis as MYB activators or MYB suppressors/repressors, respectively. This review focuses on the potential and differential domains present in the MYB suppressors in gymnosperms along with their phylogenetic analysis. The details of all the sequences included for the domain and phylogenetic analysis are included in Supplemental Table S1.

    MYB family members are functionally diverse, and apart from regulating the lignin biosynthesis pathway they also control various processes involved in plant growth and development[8,9]. The N-terminal region of the MYB proteins is highly conserved containing the MYB repeats (R) involved in DNA binding; there are three types of R repeats – R1, R2, and R3. The MYB family in plants is classified into four classes according to the presence of the number of R domain repeats: 1R-MYB or MYB-related (having R1/R2/R3), R2R3-MYB (having R2 and R3), 3R-MYB (having R1, R2 and R3), and 4R-MYB (having R1, two R2 and R1/R2)[8]. The C-terminal region of the MYB proteins is highly variable and contains the regulatory domain (activation/suppression domain)[8].

    While there are several MYB members that positively regulate lignin synthesis, only a few from the R2R3-MYB class and their homologues in plant species including woody trees, negatively regulate lignin synthesis[10]. Arabidopsis is the most well studied plant model, where the R2R3-MYB members are well characterized. The R2R3-MYB class in Arabidopsis is the largest among the MYB family with 126 members which contains the basic helix-loop-helix (bHLH) domain within the R3 region. The R2R3 class is further classified into 25 subgroups depending on the motifs in the C-terminal region[9]. Subgroup 4 of the R2R3-MYB class comprises four members in Arabidopsis - MYB3, MYB4, MYB7, and MYB32[11,12]. These members contain conserved MYB motifs - LLsrGIDPxT/SHRxI/L (C1 motif) at the end of the R3 repeat and the C2 motif (pdLHLD/LLxIG/S) in the C-terminal regions. The C2 motif harbors the LxLxL-type or DLNxxP-type repression motif (Ethylene-responsive element binding factor-associated Amphiphilic Repression abbreviated as EAR)[1315]. MYB4, MYB7, and MYB32 additionally possess a putative zinc-finger motif (ZF motif, CX1–2CX7–12CX2C) and a conserved GY/FDFLGL motif (part of the C4 motif) in their C-termini region[14]. MYB3, MYB4, MYB7, and MYB32 have been demonstrated to function as the transcriptional repressors of phenylpropanoid pathway - lignin biosynthesis pathway and/or the biosynthesis of pigments in Arabidopsis[11,12]. MYB3 negatively regulates cinnamate 4-hydroxylase (C4H) that catalyses the second step of the phenylpropanoid pathway leading to lignin and pigment synthesis, while MYB4 can inhibit almost all the enzymes in the lignin synthesis pathway causing a decrease in lignin synthesis[10,16]. R2R3-MYB members from other angiosperm species that negatively regulate lignin biosynthesis included in this review are MYB156/MYB221 from populus (Populus trichocarpa), EgMYB1 from eucalyptus (Eucalyptus gunnii), ZmMYB31/ZmMYB42 from maize (Zea mays) and PvMYB4 from switchgrass (Panicum virgatum)[10,1720].

    Similar to the repressors, the R2R3-MYB members that act as activators of the lignin biosynthesis pathway possess the conserved R2, R3, and bHLH domains in their N-terminal region, and their C-terminal region is highly variable. But unlike the repressors, where the characteristic repressor motif e.g. EAR has been described, the presence of a specific activator motif has not been described in the R2R3-MYB activators of the lignin biosynthesis pathway in multiple angiosperm species such as Arabidopsis (MYB58, MYB63)[21], eucalyptus (EgMYB2)[22] and populus (Populus tomentosa, PtoMYB92, PtoMYB216)[23,24]. However, a few activator motifs such as SG7 and SG7-2[9,25] have been reported in the C-terminal of R2R3-MYB members belonging to subgroup 7, which positively regulates flavonoid synthesis e.g. in grapevine (VvMYBF1)[25] and Arabidopsis (AtMYB12 and AtMYB111)[9].

    Both, the repressor and activator R2R3-MYB members, repress or activate the genes from the lignin biosynthesis pathway respectively, by binding to the AC elements (adenosine and cytosine-enriched sequences) present in the promoters of lignin biosynthetic genes[26]. Another way in which these R2R3-MYB members function is by interacting with Glabrous 3 (GL3), which is the key element of the MYB-bHLH-WD40 (MBW) complex that regulates the lignin biosynthesis pathway, flavonoid biosynthesis and trichome development in Arabidopsis[27]. The repressors compete with the activators to bind to GL3 or to the AC elements of promoters, to bring about the repression of the lignin biosynthesis pathway genes[12,28].

    Apart from repressors and activators, the R2R3-MYB family comprises members that act as master regulators of cell wall formation, e.g. MYB46 which is a multifaceted R2R3-MYB transcription factor in Arabidopsis. MYB46 along with its paralogue MYB83, functions as a master switch for the secondary cell wall biosynthesis that not only mediates the transcriptional network involved in the secondary cell wall formation, but also regulates the genes from the cellulose, hemicellulose and lignin biosynthesis pathways including upstream regulators and downstream targets[29].

    To date, only two studies in gymnosperms have validated the repressor activity of the R2R3-MYB transcription factor in the lignin biosynthetic pathway - GbMYBR1 in Ginkgo biloba (Ginkgo) and CfMYB5 in Chinese cedar (Cryptomeria fortunei Hooibrenk)[30,31]. Recently, differential regulation of the MYBs (copies of MYB3 and MYB4) that potentially act as suppressors and the variation in lignin synthesis in response to light quality in the Norway spruce (Picea abies)[32] and Scots pine (Pinus sylvestris)[33] seedlings were reported based on the transcriptomic and Fourier transform infrared (FTIR) analysis. The Scots pine reads in the previous study[33] were aligned to the loblolly pine (Pinus taeda) genome (v1.01)[34], therefore the corresponding MYB sequences retrieved from loblolly pine were considered for this review. MYB3 copies from Picea were named Pa_AtMYB3-like1, Pa_AtMYB3-like2, and so on, while copies from Pinus were named Pt_AtMYB3-like1, Pt_AtMYB3-like2, and so on. A similar naming convention was followed for the MYB4 copies from both conifers. A total of 23 MYB repressors from gymnosperms including eight sequences from Norway spruce, 13 sequences from loblolly pine and one sequence from Ginkgo and one sequence from Chinese cedar were recruited for the analysis.

    The earlier phylogenetic analysis suggested GbMYBR1 to be a distinct MYB suppressor closely related to MYB5 from Arabidopsis[30] and showed that CfMYB5 was grouped with ZmMYB31 (Zea mays), EgMYB1 (Eucalyptus grandis) and AtMYB4 (Arabidopsis), which inhibited lignin synthesis[31]. For the current review, MYB members reported by earlier studies[11,12,1720,24,30,32,33,35] were included in the phylogenetic tree (Fig. 1), which was constructed using Phylogeny.fr with default settings[36]. MYB members from Arabidopsis that repress the phenylpropanoid pathway such as MYB3, MYB4, MYB7 and MYB32 (AtMYB3, AtMYB4, MYB7, MYB32) were included in the phylogenetic tree as Arabidopsis is the most well-studied model system in plants. CfMYB5 and GbMYBR1 were included in the phylogenetic tree as they are the R2R3-MYB repressor genes from gymnosperms that negatively regulate the lignin biosynthesis pathway[30,31]. MYB5 from Arabidopsis (AtMYB5) was included in the construction of the phylogenetic tree as some of the MYB members from conifers showed the presence of the provisional MYB5 repressor in the C-terminal domain in the Conserved Domain Database[37] (CDD) search and GbMYBR1 is closely related to MYB5 from Arabidopsis[30]. The MYB3/MYB4 copies from Norway spruce and Scots pine (corresponding Pinus taeda sequences) from earlier studies[32,33], which were proposed to repress lignin synthesis, were included in the phylogenetic tree. R2R3-MYB family members from a few other species that repress lignin biosynthesis were included in the phylogenetic tree, e.g. Potri_MYB156 and Potri_MYB221 from populus; EgMYB1 from eucalyptus; PvMYB4 from switchgrass; ZmMYB31 and ZmMYB42 from maize[10,1720]. PtoMYB170 and PtoMYB216 from Populus tomentosa and, AtMYB58 and AtMYB63 from Arabidopsis, which positively regulates lignin deposition during the formation of wood[21,35], were included in the phylogenetic tree as an outgroup.

    Figure 1.  Phylogenetic tree constructed with copies of MYB3-like and MYB4-like from Picea abies (Pa) and Pinus taeda (Pt) along with GbMYBR1 from Ginkgo biloba (Gb); CfMYB5 from Cryptomeria fortune (Cf); MYB3, MYB4, MYB5, MYB7, MYB32, MYB58 and MYB63 from Arabidopsis thaliana (At); MYB156 and MYB221 from Populus trichocarpa (Potri); MYB170 and MYB216 from Populus tomentosa (Pto); EgMYB1 from Eucalyptus gunnii (Eg); ZmMYB31 and ZmMYB42 from Zea mays (Zm) and, PvMYB4 from Panicum virgatum (Pv).

    The phylogenetic tree (Fig. 1) shows two distinct sub-clades, one sub-clade that contains all the MYB3-like members from the two conifers (except Pt_AtMYB3-like7) and one MYB4-like member from spruce (Pa_AtMYB4-like3), along with AtMYB5 and GbMYBR1. The other sub-clade includes all the MYB4-like members from the two conifers along with AtMYB3 and AtMYB4 from Arabidopsis, and the R2R3-MYB family suppressors from populus, eucalyptus, switchgrass, and maize. Overall, the phylogenetic analysis shows a clear separation of the MYB3-like and MYB4-like R2R3-MYB members from the two conifer species into two groups, where the GbMYBR1 from Ginkgo groups with the MYB3-like members. This suggests that the MYB3-like members from conifers and Ginkgo may have distinct motifs which differ from the motifs present in the angiosperms. However, the MYB4-like conifer members seem to have motifs that are similar to angiosperm species e.g. many of the MYB4-like conifer members contain the EAR motif, while EAR was detected in only one of the MYB3-like members (Pt_AtMYB3-like1). CfMYB5 from Chinese cedar seems to contain unique motifs compared to all the gymnosperm members included in this study.

    Alignments of MYB repressors from the gymnosperms and angiosperms species are included in the Supplemental information (Supplemental Figs S1S5). GbMYBR1 shows distinct sequence characteristics; it has low identity with characterized MYB4 repressors from Arabidopsis and other angiosperm species. Although the characteristic domains of the R2R3-type repressors e.g. C1, C2, ZF, and C4 motifs and, the typical repressors motifs like the LxLxL-type EAR motif and the TLLLFR motif are absent in GbMYBR1 from the C-terminal, GbMYBR1 has the R2 and R3 domain in the N-terminal region including the conserved bHLH-binding motif (Fig. 2)[30]. CfMYB5 from Chinese cedar contains the conserved R2 and R3 domains in the N-terminal like Ginkgo, however, the study did not report any typical R2R3-type suppressor domain in its C-terminal[31]. The current sequence analysis reports the presence of the EAR suppression domain (LCLSL) in the C-terminal region of CfMYB5 (Fig. 3, Supplemental Fig. S5), which is novel.

    Copies or homologs of MYB3 and MYB4 were detected to be differentially regulated under shade (Low Red : Far-red) in Norway spruce and Scots pine and these MYB copies were proposed to repress the lignin synthesis as their down-regulation correlated with enhanced lignin synthesis[32,33]. Alignments[38] performed with the different copies of MYB repressors reported by earlier studies[8,30,32,33] show that the sequences are well conserved in gymnosperms and angiosperms in the N-terminal regions (R2, R3 along with the bHLH binding motif) but not in the C-terminal region (Fig. 2, Supplemental Figs S1S5) which are in accordance with the previous findings. The C-terminal regions (with the C1, C2, ZF, and C4 motifs) are the most variable regions within the different conifer MYB members (Supplemental Figs S1S4) which agrees with the findings in Arabidopsis[8,9]. The alignment of partial C-terminal regions of MYB repressors from gymnosperms and angiosperms (Fig. 3) show that most MYB3/MYB4 copies from both conifers lack the classical LxLxL-type EAR motif. It is worth noting that generally monocots possess the LNLDL motif and dicots have the LNLEL motif, while the conifers show the presence of both LNLDL and LNLEL, in addition to four more patterns – LNLNL, LDLGL, LDLQL, and LQLLL (Fig. 3). In Pt_AtMYB4-like1, Pt_AtMYB4-like3, Pt_AtMYB4-like4, and Pa_AtMYB4-like1, either LNLNL/LNLDL/LDLGL, LNLNL/LNLEL or LNLDL/LDLQL or LNLNL/LNLEL could function as a potential repressor, respectively (alternative EAR domains are marked with a box and, bold and underlined for Pt_AtMYB4-like1, Pt_AtMYB4-like3, Pt_AtMYB4-like4, and Pa_ AtMYB4-like1 in Fig. 3). It is also possible that LNLNLDLGL and LNLNLEL could function as a unique type of lignin repressor in conifers. CfMYB5 from Chinese cedar also shows the presence of a new pattern of the EAR motif (LCLSL), which was not described previously in this species by earlier investigations and is not represented in the angiosperms. None of the gymnosperm MYB members contain the conserved TLLLFR motif or the GY/FDFLGL motif, which are essential for the repressor activity of the transcription factors (Supplemental Figs S4 & S5)[12,14]. This is similar to the unique kind of R2R3-MYB-type repressor reported recently in Ginkgo (GbMYBR1)[30]. Similar to GbMYBR1, all the MYB3/MYB4 copies in both the conifer species contain the bHLH binding motif in the R3 region that could potentially be involved in the repression mechanism[30].

    Figure 2.  Alignment of N-terminal regions of the lignin repressor MYB members from gymnosperms and angiosperms showing the conserved R2, R3, and bHLH domains: MYB3-like and MYB4-like copies from Picea abies (Pa) and Pinus taeda (Pt) along with GbMYBR1 from Ginkgo biloba (Gb); CfMYB5 from Cryptomeria fortune (Cf); MYB3, MYB4, MYB7, and MYB32 from Arabidopsis thaliana (At); MYB156 and MYB221 from Populus trichocarpa (Potri); EgMYB1 from Eucalyptus gunnii (Eg); ZmMYB31 and ZmMYB42 from Zea mays (Zm) and PvMYB4 from Panicum virgatum (Pv).
    Figure 3.  Alignment of partial C-terminal regions of the lignin repressor MYB members from gymnosperms and angiosperms showing the conserved EAR domain (alternative EAR domains in Pt_AtMYB4-like1, Pt_AtMYB4-like3, Pt_AtMYB4-like4, and Pa_AtMYB4-like1 are marked with box and, bold and underlined): MYB3-like and MYB4-like copies from Picea abies (Pa) and Pinus taeda (Pt) along with GbMYBR1 from Ginkgo biloba (Gb); CfMYB5 from Cryptomeria fortune (Cf); MYB3, MYB4, MYB7, and MYB32 from Arabidopsis thaliana (At); MYB156 and MYB221 from Populus trichocarpa (Potri); EgMYB1 from Eucalyptus gunnii (Eg); ZmMYB31 and ZmMYB42 from Zea mays (Zm) and PvMYB4 from Panicum virgatum (Pv).

    Except for two MYB members in Pinus (Pt_AtMYB3-like7 and Pt_AtMYB4-like3), all the other MYB sequences in both conifers possess either the EAR repressor motif in the C-terminal (Fig. 3) and/or the putative repressor domain PLN03212 in the N-terminal region (Supplemental Table S1). The PLN03212 domain was detected in the motif search using CDD[37] with a very low E-value. The PLN03212 domain is the provisional repressor domain for the transcription factor MYB5 in Arabidopsis, but this domain has not been functionally characterized. MYB5 represses the flavonoid pathway, regulates mucilage synthesis, and plays a role in the development of the seed coat and trichome morphogenesis[39]. The PLN03212 domain is also present in GbMYBR1, but its potential function in the process of repression has not been reported[30]. The PLN03091 was yet another domain that was detected in the searches with CDD with a very low E-value in MYB suppressors from both conifers, similar to lignin repressors of other plant species (Supplemental Table S1). The PLN03091 is denoted as a provisional hypothetical protein in the CDD.

    It is proposed that conifers contain different types of MYB3/MYB4-like repressors, some of which contain the classical repressor motifs and others without the repressor motifs (e.g. LxLxL) analogous to that of GbMYBR1. Similar to GbMYBR1, the MYB3/MYB4-like repressors detected in Norway spruce and Scots pine[32,33] might have distinct sequence characteristics or motifs, whose potential functional characterisation needs further validation. These repressors and their mode of regulation especially regarding the defense and phenylpropanoid pathways might be unique to conifer species, which also needs further characterization.

    The repressors from the MYB family are not fully explored in gymnosperms unlike the well-studied model plants e.g. Arabidopsis. GbMYBR1 from Ginkgo is mainly expressed in young leaves, although its expression was detected in the roots, stem and fruits; the expression level of GbMYBR1 in young leaves were more than 12-fold higher than the levels in roots or stems. GbMYBR1 is a unique kind of R2R3-MYB-type repressor that lacks the characteristic repressor motifs e.g. EAR motif and the TLLLFR motif from the C-terminal region, yet it suppresses the lignin biosynthesis pathway. Overexpression of GbMYBR1 in Arabidopsis represses lignin synthesis specifically through down-regulation of the key lignin biosynthesis pathway gene – hydroxycinnamoyl CoA: shikimate hydroxycinnamoyl transferase (HCT) which encodes the enzyme that catalyzes the rate-limiting step of the lignin biosynthesis pathway. In addition, GbMYBR1 down-regulates a few other genes from the lignin biosynthesis pathway including phenylalanine ammonia-lyase (PAL), 4-coumarate: CoA ligase (4CL) and cinnamyl alcohol dehydrogenase (CAD). GbMYBR1 overexpression also reduces the pathogen resistance by significantly down-regulating a great number of defence-related genes in the transgenic Arabidopsis. Moreover, the transgenic Arabidopsis overexpressing GbMYBR1 was more susceptible to bacterial infection as compared to the wild type. However, the regulatory process of the GbMYBR1 is entirely different from Arabidopsis; the lignin synthesis suppression by GbMYBR1 is not only more specific compared to the MYB repressors in Arabidopsis but the mode of action of GbMYBR1 to repress lignin synthesis is different from Arabidopsis[30]. The GbMYBR1 mode of action is mediated through direct and specific interaction with GL3 to compete against the interaction of GL3 with MYB activators, leading to the suppression of lignin synthesis[30]. For example, in Arabidopsis, the MYB4 that represses the lignin biosynthesis pathway, physically interacts not only with GL3 but also with other bHLH cofactors (e.g. TT8 and EGL3) to bring about the suppression[40]. Thus, the interaction of Arabidopsis repressor MYB with bHLH cofactors is not as specific as for GbMYBR1. In addition, overexpression of GbMYBR1 led to the down-regulation of HCT – a key gene from the lignin biosynthesis pathway along with only a few other genes from the lignin biosynthesis pathway in contrast to other angiosperm species where expression of multiple genes was affected along with reduced lignification as a result of the overexpression of MYB that acts as a repressor[30]. Thus, the suppression of GbMYBR1 on lignin biosynthesis is more specific than for the other repressor MYBs in Arabidopsis. Su et al. proposed the working model of GbMYBR1 and presented the details on the regulatory mechanism of GbMYBR1 in transgenic Arabidopsis[30], yet whether GbMYBR1 directly regulates the genes from lignin biosynthetic pathway in Ginkgo needs to be further explored and validated.

    CfMYB5 from Chinese cedar which negatively regulates the lignin biosynthesis is a nucleus-localized protein that is expressed at higher levels in the stem as compared to the needle, bud, male cone, and root[31]. The repressor activity of CfMYB5 was demonstrated from the analysis of its expression patterns; overexpression of CfMYB5 in the transgenic lines correlated with the decrease in expression of the key genes involved in the lignin biosynthesis pathway (HCT, PAL, 4CL, and CAD) along with a decrease in secondary cell wall formation which involves the deposition of both lignin and cellulose. Thus, CfMYB5 suppression was not specific only for lignin synthesis.

    MYB4 has been demonstrated to respond to light quality in Arabidopsis; for example, UV-B irradiation down-regulates MYB4[13]. As the MYB repressor is involved in the negative regulation of the lignin biosynthesis pathway, its down-regulation leads to higher lignin synthesis. In Norway spruce, down-regulation of two copies of MYB3 under shade (Low Red : Far-red ratio) in the northern populations correlated with higher lignin synthesis in the case of north vs south comparisons[32] (Supplemental Table S1). While none of the repressors were detected to be differentially regulated under shade in the southern population, an equal number of repressors (MYB3/MYB4) were found to be up-regulated and down-regulated (p-value > 0.05) in the northern population of Norway spruce[32]. Nevertheless, MYB3/MYB4 gene expression in Scots pine was not fully in favour of higher lignin synthesis under shade[33]. The Scots pine reads in a previous study[33] were aligned to the loblolly pine (Pinus taeda) genome (v1.01)[34], therefore the corresponding MYB sequences retrieved from loblolly pine were considered for this review, as mentioned previously. Therefore, it is important to note that the Pinus taeda information in Supplemental Table S1 corresponds to Scots pine. An equal numbers of repressors (MYB3/MYB4) were found to be up-regulated and down-regulated (p-value > 0.05) respectively in the southern and northern Scots pine population under shade (Supplemental Table S1). In the case of north vs south comparisons, four MYB members were found to be up-regulated in the northern Scots pine population as compared to the southern population under shade, suggesting higher lignin synthesis in the southern population[33]. The analysis for genes that positively regulate the lignin biosynthesis in these studies suggest an equal number of genes being up-regulated and down-regulated under shade in both the conifer species[32,33]. However, the FTIR spectroscopic data confirmed higher synthesis of lignin in response to shade as compared to the sun conditions in both conifers[32,33]. The difference in the binding capacity between the MYB family members may be one of the possible reasons behind the inconsistency between MYB3/MYB4 expression and lignin synthesis. A proteomic and metabolomic analysis may reveal concordance between the FTIR data and the MYB3/MYB4 regulatory mechanism. In addition, it is the highly variable C-terminal region of different plant MYBs that contains the repressor domain, which is not characterized in conifers. For example, in Arabidopsis, a change (D261N) in a conserved amino acid in the GY/FDFLGL motif present in the C-terminal region of the R2R3-type MYB4 transcription repressor resulted in abolishing its repressive activity[14]. The N-terminal region of the different MYB members in both conifers was found to be conserved while the C-terminal region was highly variable (Supplemental Figs S1S5). It is proposed that conifers may contain novel motifs in the C-terminal region of the MYB members that may be specific to conifer species, which needs to be functionally validated[41]. Furthermore, there could be conifer-specific co-repressors that interact in general with the MYB members of subgroup 4 and specifically with MYB3 to regulate the phenylpropanoid pathway similar to Arabidopsis where the NIGHT LIGHT-INDUCIBLE AND CLOCK-REGULATED1 (LNK1) and LNK2 act as co-repressors along with MYB3[42]. The LNK-MYB3 transcription complex plays a role in the repression of the C4H gene, one of the key genes involved in lignin biosynthesis[42]. Other factors contributing to the phenylpropanoid pathway regulation includes interactions between the MYB members that are co-expressed, their probable interactions with other transcription factors and the feedback loops. These need further investigation in conifers. Similar arguments were proposed for the detection of several grass MYB4 homologs binding to the promoters of genes involved in the lignin biosynthesis pathway, which was not in accordance with the expression of the MYB4 genes[43,44].

    The increase in lignin synthesis in response to shade in conifers[32,33] is a contrasting feature compared to angiosperms, where shade causes a decrease in lignin synthesis due to which the angiosperm becomes weak and susceptible to diseases[45,46]. The underlying mechanism, whether and how the MYB repressors may be involved in this process in conifers needs further research.

    The sequence analysis suggests that although the domains of the MYB repressors from the lignin biosynthesis pathway are conserved among the angiosperms and gymnosperms in their N-terminal regions, they may possess diverse repressor domains in the C-terminal regions that have not been functionally characterized. Gymnosperms are ancient and functionally diverse compared to angiosperms in many ways. For example, comparative genome annotation studies revealed notable differences in the size of the NDH-complex gene family and the genes underlying the functional basis of response to shade suggesting specialization of the photosynthetic apparatus in Pinaceae[47]. Likewise, it is proposed that the lignin biosynthesis pathway in conifers may function through alternative mechanisms, unlike those observed in the angiosperms, as suggested by the study in Ginkgo[30]. Further investigation is required for functional validation of all the conifer MYB repressors discussed in this review aiming to elucidate the mechanisms underlying the repression of the conifer lignin biosynthesis pathway.

    The authors confirm contribution to the paper as follows: study conception and design: Ranade SS; García-Gil MR; data collection: Ranade SS; analysis and interpretation of results: Ranade SS; draft manuscript preparation: Ranade SS; García-Gil MR. All authors reviewed the results and approved the final version of the manuscript.

    All data generated or analyzed during this study are included in this published article and its supplementary information files.

    We acknowledge the support from FORMAS (FA-2021/0038) and Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation.

  • The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

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  • Cite this article

    Bendiksby HK, Labib A. 2023. Learning from disasters: the 22/7-terrorism in Norway and COVID-19 through a failure modelling lens. Emergency Management Science and Technology 3:7 doi: 10.48130/EMST-2023-0007
    Bendiksby HK, Labib A. 2023. Learning from disasters: the 22/7-terrorism in Norway and COVID-19 through a failure modelling lens. Emergency Management Science and Technology 3:7 doi: 10.48130/EMST-2023-0007

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Learning from disasters: the 22/7-terrorism in Norway and COVID-19 through a failure modelling lens

Abstract: Disasters can have detrimental impacts on lives, reputations, trust, and resources. The aim of this paper is to illustrate how root cause analysis methods can be used to learn from failures in both security and safety domains. Utilising two case studies within the security and safety domains, respectively the 22-7 terrorism and Norway and the COVID-19 pandemic within the UK, we investigate how using a hybrid model approach consisting of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) and Minimum Cut Set Analysis (MCSA), helps identify the causality between failures and the catastrophic events. Results illustrate the benefits of using a hybrid of root cause analysis techniques to extract learning lessons, in order to mitigate against future similar incidents. We applied techniques that can assist organisations to apply the concept of learning from failures in practice. More specifically, the Fault Tree Analysis - for analysing causality, Reliability Block Diagram - for analysing relationships between causal factors, and Minimum Cut Set Analysis - for analysing vulnerable scenarios, were applied to the two cases, demonstrating how these models can aid in their 'de-blackening'.

    • Disasters can have detrimental impacts on lives, reputations, trust, and resources[1]. These events are perceived to have a low probability of occurring, but with severe consequences[2,3]. They are the 'Black Swans' and 'Black Elephants'[4] of the organisational world; Black Swans characterised by their rarity, unexpectedness, and unpredictability – albeit, oftentimes retrospective predictability[46] On 22nd July 2011, the Norwegian society was faced with the 'unimaginable'; two successive terrorist attacks were carried out by an ethnic-Norwegian lone perpetrator[6]. In many countries this would not have been unexpected, but for Norway at that moment in time, it was a Black Swan event. Conversely, some events are more imaginable, and perhaps even predicted, making them Black Elephants[5]. COVID-19 within the UK is an example of this as there were predictors of a pending pandemic. These two events are the case studies which will be further explored in this paper; one where the dust has already settled, and another that is still, at the time of writing this paper, very much alive.

      The above cases are disasters; forcing society out of normalcy due to the sheer magnitude of the catastrophic event[79]. Interestingly, had these failures been detected promptly, the chain reaction which caused them to escalate into disasters could, in theory, have been mitigated[3]. From a learning perspective, disasters tend to inspire change of practice more easily than failures due to how they are perceived[3,7]. Thus, this paper will examine whether there is potential for organisations to learn from the two cases presented in the form of i) feedback from the users to design, ii) the incorporation of advanced tools in innovative applications, and iii) the fostering of interdisciplinary approaches to generic lessons[10]. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) will be introduced, before being applied to the two cases, but first, the paper will provide a brief review of the literature on organisational learning from successes vs failure.

    • The word 'success' carries positive connotations, and is what most organisations desire. Thus, the emphasis in the literature has often been on learning from successes[1,11,12]. However, success-oriented learning can present organisations with a challenge: the development of an overconfidence bias. As asserted by Labib & Read[10], too much belief in previous successes may result in skewed risk perception. This false sense of security has seen unthinkable disasters unfold in the likes of Titanic and NASA's fatal shuttle missions[10].

      Emerging literature therefore challenges the traditionalist view of learning from successes by suggesting failures contain valuable information, setting the premise for effective organisational learning and resilience[1,10,13]. Indeed, failure encourages change by challenging the status quo[10]. It confronts decision-makers with the 'what', 'why' and 'how', in which experimental learning can prevail[10,14]. Moreover, failures can aid organisations identify gaps in their knowledge and subsequently the root causes of these[2].

      Learning from failures can be challenging for organisations as it requires deep and mindful exploration of what went wrong, which can be a painful process[2,3,15] . Furthermore, appropriate detection and analysis of the failure is necessary[3,16]. Organisational culture is thus important in enabling effective learning, as culpability and reputational factors can cause reluctance to engage in the process[3,15]. However, introspection is not the sole prerequisite for learning from failures. Whilst it must be acknowledged that hindsight is not a sufficient predictor for new risks, cross-organisational isomorphic learning can be a useful learning tool[17,18]. In fact, it is proposed that any failure within a system (i.e. organisation A) can occur within a different system that shares similar characteristics (i.e. organisation B)[18,19].

      Problematically, organisational unlearning is not uncommon[20]. This can happen when organisations have 'no' memory of previous incidents, due to e.g. high personnel turnover, and failures may therefore reoccur[21]. Mahler[22] has conceptualised this notion of unlearning, dividing it into three subtypes of lessons: i) those not learned, ii) those learned only superficially, and iii) those learned then subsequently unlearned. To combat this, models such as the FTA and RBD can be valuable in providing a visual representation of causal factors, effectively functioning as mental models for personnel and decision-makers alike[3,20]. This is due to the models' ability to help map causal factors, their relationship, and identify the vulnerabilities within the whole system.

    • As set out by Baubion[23], 'risk knowledge is the foundation of crisis and emergency preparedness'. Thus, a proactive risk management process is desired to maintain high reliability within the organisation[7]. To achieve this, the organisation must be viewed as a complex sociotechnical system in which all components are considered when analysing threats, hazards, and vulnerabilities[7,23]. Reliability analysis tools, such as the FTA and RBD, are commonly used to account for these complexities[24]. Adopting a hybrid model approach, by combining these two methods, can be useful in identifying the causality between failures and the catastrophic event[3]. Moreover, it can aid in the optimisation of resource allocation to tackle identified safety gaps and 'weak links', mitigating against future disastrous events and costly consequences[1,3,24]. The analytical step is critical, as failing to discuss and analyse major failures hinders organisational learning[25].

      The FTA and RBD are complementary; the outcome of the FTA serves as the input for the RBD[1], and as such a Fault Tree is the natural first step of the analysis. It is a logic diagram, in which the relationship between a specified undesirable event (i.e. disaster) and failure components of said event are showcased in cascading fashion[1,3]. With the undesired event ('top event') at the top of the tree, it branches out to contributing events in a hierarchical manner, working its way down to basic events, or 'initiators'[1,3]. The events are connected through logic gates. AND-gates signifies that all input events must occur for the output event to happen, whereas with OR-gates only one event needs to occur to trigger the output event[1,3]. Whilst it must be acknowledged that other logic gates do exist, AND- and OR-gates can model most problems and are used to build the RBD[1,7]. Within a crisis management context, the basic events connected with an AND-gate are equivalent to a parallel structure in the RBD, whereas a series structure indicates that OR-gates have been used[1]. To further the analysis and inform decision-making, a 'minimum cut set' exercise can be conducted on the RBD. This will help conceptualise the minimum number of failures that must happen for the top event to occur. Such analysis of combination of causal factors provides 'scenario-based' or 'what-if' analysis, which can further enrich our understanding of the relationship between different factors. Such scenario planning can then be incorporated in the design of new drills and simulation exercises such as table-top exercises (TTX) or live exercises (LIVEX).

      Although the applied tools in this work are well-established in their characteristics as well as applications, their application for the chosen case studies in this paper is innovative and would add to the existing body of knowledge from an applications standpoint. Literature on learning from failures has been varied in terms of the different tools used and the cases considered. For example, a hybrid of tools such as FTA, RBD, and the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) were incorporated to support humanitarian operations and crisis management to analyse the two cases of Bhopal and Fukushima disasters[26].The same tools were also used in the context of high reliability organisations (HRO), such as within the oil and gas industry[27]. Hybrid techniques of FTA, RBD, failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) and AHP have also been incorporated to analyse incidents within the aviation industry[28]. Although such tools have strengths in terms of problem structuring, causal analysis, identification and prioritisation of root causes, and assessment of vulnerabilities in the system, they also suffer from limitations such as their limited capabilities to capture interdependence, and lack of guidance on degree of detail for the analysis. Nevertheless, their use, particularly as a hybrid, has the potential to increase our understanding of the case studies at hand and provide enrichment to the decision-making support process and policy – especially those related to optimised resource allocations.

    • On 22nd July 2011 a bomb was detonated outside the Government Quarters in Oslo, Norway. At the time, the Norwegian Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet) was in government. The perpetrator was not immediately identified. Roughly two hours later, police were alerted of a shooting on a small island, Utøya, 40 min from Oslo[2931]. Here the annual summer camp of the Labour Party's youth organisation (AUF) was hosted, and 530 of the 564 individuals on the island were children and young adults[32]. The gunman, right-wing extremist Anders Behring Breivik, had conned himself onto the island dressed as a police officer, saying he was there to secure it following the Oslo bombing – a bomb he had made himself from fertilizer. Within minutes of stepping onto the island, he started shooting[29,31]. By the time police made it to Utøya, Breivik had already been there for more than an hour, hunting down the camp participants[30]. He was apprehended by police without a single shot being fired.

    • An independent commission, the 22/7-Commision, was appointed to investigate how the massacre could happen[33]. Thus, this is where the main causes of failure have been obtained[33,34].

      i) The bombing of the Government Quarters could have been prevented if already adopted security measures had been effectively implemented.

      ii) Breivik could have been stopped earlier, as a quicker police response was realistic. It was concluded that the authorities failed to protect the individuals at Utøya.

      iii) More security and emergency preparedness measures should have been implemented, as the ability to effectively learn from exercises and use developed plans was poor.

      iv) With a broader focus and a different working methodology, the Police Security Service (PST) could have become aware of Breivik prior to 22/7.

      v) Ineffective inter-agency working and communication. The mantra following 22/7 became 'the resources that did not find each other'.

      vi) The ability to understand and acknowledge risk had not been sufficient.

      However, it is worth noting that the report does not come without criticism[35].

    • The 22/7-attacks had fatal consequences, and remains one of the deadliest mass shootings by a lone perpetrator globally[36,37]. A total of 77 people died following the massacre: eight in the bombing and 69 at Utøya[29,31].

    • To the best of our knowledge, FTA and RBD has not yet been applied to the 22/7-case and therefore provides an interesting opportunity.

      The FTA in Fig. 1 is divided into direct causes and contributing factors – connected by an AND-gate, as they both had an impact on the consequences. The direct causes are identified as 1) the bombing and 2) the shooting. The rhombus signifies an undeveloped event, and is used to acknowledge that whilst the events could be further developed (e.g. into sociological and psychological factors affecting Breivik), a choice has been made not to. They are connected by an AND-gate, as both events account for the terrorist attack, although an OR-gate would also suffice as the separate events would both constitute as singular acts of terrorism.

      Figure 1. 

      Fault Tree Analysis of the 22/7 terrorism.

      The contributing factors are connected by an AND-gate, as they all contributed towards Breivik having every possibility to 'succeed' in his plans. The inadequate intelligence gathering particularly comes down to mistaken prioritisation due to a flawed national risk assessment, which read 'right- and left-wing extremism will also not in 2011 pose a serious threat to the Norwegian society'[38]. Additionally, there was a non-timely implementation of proposed security measures, such as closing off the street leading to the Government Quarters. This was already recommended in 2004 by the Police Directorate, as it was believed the risk of a car bomb being placed right next to the entrance was high[39]. Seven years later Breivik did just that. Much of this can be argued to stem from a naivety found within the Norwegian society, paired with the mindset of 'it does not happen here'. The risks were thus not adequately understood and acknowledged[39].

      Lastly is the inadequate emergency response. The unpreparedness, failed inter-agency working, and lack of appropriate equipment are connected by an OR-gate. This is because the emergency response was an overall weakness within the system, where all three events did not need to occur simultaneously for a system failure to unfold. This is particularly visible within the RBD and subsequent cut set, seen in Fig. 2, where only one of boxes 6-7-8 must be cut to 'short-circuit' the emergency response.

      Figure 2. 

      Reliability Block Diagram of 22/7 (left) and Cut Set Analysis of the RBD (right).

    • Based on the above analysis, there are areas that must be addressed to mitigate against future threats, particularly within the emergency response. Improved preparedness and resilience should be sought through active learning in scenario-based and inter-agency work training. This can be achieved through simulation exercises in the form of either tabletop or live exercises. A key focus must be on communication so that the resources can indeed 'find each other' in times of crisis. It must be acknowledged that Norway presents a varied topography, and the resources should mirror this. At Utøya, the police faced challenges with both their boats and helicopter, delaying their response. Furthermore, the concept of risk must be thoroughly understood, and proposed security measures effectively acted upon. Additionally, Breivik 'slipped through the system' undetected, even though there were several warning signs. Improved detection and information-sharing processes (falling under intelligence) are thus important.

    • In January 2020, the UK saw its first confirmed case of COVID-19[40,41]. Since then, the UK has suffered immensely from the damages caused by the virus[42].

    • The UK's handling of the COVID-19 pandemic presents a particularly interesting case study, as the primary response of the Government adversely impacted the containment of the virus (e.g.[42]). A public inquiry is ongoing[43]. Thus, the below causes of failure have been identified through a combination of news reports and official publications at the time of writing.

      i) Failed and late primary strategy by the Government, in the hopes of reportedly obtaining herd immunity[42,44].

      ii) Unprepared to handle a virus pandemic – the preparedness strategy focused on influenza[45,46].

      iii) NHS in crisis: PPE shortages, austerity, staff shortages[42,47,48].

      iv) Non-compliance during the pandemic for a variety of reasons, e.g. COVID-deniers, pandemic fatigue, communication barriers and economic survival of low-income families[46,49,50].

      v) Lockdown and its impact on the economy[51].

    • To date (9th May, 2023, more than twenty million individuals had tested positive for COVID-19 in the UK (see: https://coronavirus.data.gov.uk/details/cases), with a total of 182,753 COVID-related deaths[52]. The coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has led to record declines in gross domestic product (GDP) in advanced economies in 2020[62].

    • Within this paper, a generalised approach has been taken towards COVID-19 in the UK. It is thus not comprehensive in terms of neither width, nor depth, but as asserted by Labib[42], it conceptualises aspects of the crisis within a Fault Tree. While Labib[42] provides a more narrowed focus on the exponential spread of the virus, this analysis adopts a broader viewpoint, accounting for contributing factors as to why it became a crisis.

      As opposed to the 22/7 FTA, this tree is categorised differently; accounting for virus spread, public health, and economic impact, as shown in Fig. 3. These three aspects all contributed towards the crisis escalation and are thus adjoined by an AND-gate. Factors affecting the uncontrollable spread are identified as a non-timely, unprepared, and failed initial government response, alongside non-compliance and virus mutations. The latter two are presented as undeveloped events, for the sake of simplicity within the analysis. They are linked with an OR-gate, as mutations can for instance appear despite an adequate government response.

      Figure 3. 

      Fault Tree Analysis of the COVID-19 crisis escalation within the UK.

      The vast death toll in the UK has exacerbated the crisis, and there are now concerns for the long-term health impacts as a result of COVID-19[53,54], which may cause a future, secondary crisis. Moreover, death has been divided into being directly and indirectly linked to COVID-19. While statistics do not currently show an increase in deaths due to mental health during the pandemic, the Office for National Statistics warn that these numbers should be interpreted with caution due to inquest delays[54], and it is thus included in the Fault Tree. Additionally, there are concerns of a rise in undetected and untreated other serious illnesses, such as cancer, during the pandemic[55].

      Root causes directly linked to COVID-deaths have been identified as the wait for effective treatment, alongside strains on the health services. These are linked by an OR-gate, as the two events are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Waiting for vaccines has been a global phenomenon, yet some countries have managed to keep hospitals relatively unrestrained. Finally, the economic impact must be considered, where increased public welfare expenditures and a declined GPD have affected, and will continue to affect, the UK economy.

    • Based on the above Fault Tree, the uncontrollable spread presents as a weakness in the system due to its series structure, as depicted in the RBD and subsequent cut set in Fig. 4. The main lesson to be learned is the impact a failed initial government response can have on the outcome. Additionally, non-compliance with regulations, alongside mutations made the virus uncontrollable. Thus, timely measures in the early stages of the crisis would have been key to restrict future rapid transmissions[56]. This includes, but is not limited to, proactive lockdowns and effective test/trace/isolation systems[56]. Moreover, comparing the UK's response to that of other countries could have improved future procedures[42]. The public health line within the Fault Tree is also vulnerable, as Fig. 4 shows two series structures, where only one box in each series needs to be cut for system failure. Boxes 7 and 8 both deal with strains and reduced capacities within the health services, thus a focus should be on strengthening this, improving resilience for future crises.

      Figure 4. 

      Reliability Block Diagram of COVID-19 within the UK (left) and Cut Set Analysis of the RBD (right).

    • As shown in Fig. 5, the incorporation of the hybrid tools used, namely Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Reliability Block Diagram (RBD), and Cut Set Analysis (CSA), contributes to both understanding of the situation, and decision-making for improvement and mitigation. Hence, through the FTA one is able to understand the situation (problem structuring), particularly in terms of causal factors that contributed to disaster. Whereas, through RBD, one is then able to visualise the relationship between these causal factors. Finally, through CSA, one is able to perform vulnerability analysis of possible failure scenarios, and determine ways of recommendations with regard to safety barriers for both prevention and mitigation.

      Figure 5. 

      Integration of tools used: FTA, RBD and CSA.

      Applying the FTA and RBD to the above case studies have offered insight into the root causes, and subsequent vulnerability gaps, resulting in major failures[3]. While the cases came from two different domains, respectively security and safety, the models were highly applicable to both. In fact, unpreparedness and non-timely implementation of safety/security measures cut across both cases, despite being in different stages of the learning process.

      The 22/7 terrorist attacks have been investigated and already spurred organisational change, with an overhaul of the police service and updated policies[57]. Despite this, it appears that some lessons have only been learned superficially[22]. Indeed, the Police Reform has not been welcomed, and is viewed by many as a step in the wrong direction: a de-centralisation reform, centralising the police service[58]. Worth noting is another right-wing attack by a lone terrorist that was attempted in 2019. The attack was averted after one casualty, albeit not by the police, but by mosque-goers themselves[59]. Moreover, unpreparedness was central in the 22/7-case, and whilst efforts have been made to strengthen the overall emergency and preparedness response, COVID-19 showed that this was not done holistically[60]. When COVID-19 arrived, Norway was yet again unprepared. Even more so was the UK, which at the time of writing this paper has not yet officially completed the investigation and identified the learning outcome. However, some lessons can be derived from initial analyses, as mentioned above. The concept of isomorphic learning is interesting here, particularly the relevance of ongoing isomorphic learning from other countries to better inform UK practices.

    • While the FTA and subsequent RBD analyses are based on official documents and news reports, they are constructed within the narrative of the authors, in which the role of biases must be considered. To add robustness to the analyses, mathematical calculations of reliability would be beneficial. Though, this is beyond the scope of this paper, and the above analyses thus remain a qualitative construction.

      However, based on the evidence presented above, it can be concluded that the FTA and RBD are particularly suited for analysing events retrospectively, and consequently facilitate learning – turning lessons identified into lessons learned. Whilst solely relying on retrospective case-oriented analyses present as a weakness within the system of actively and accurately learning from failures[61], it can aid in the de-blackening of future events; placing these prospective Black Swans within the realm of 'regular' expectation[6].

      Moreover, the COVID-19 case study also highlights the models' applicability to ongoing crises, whereby identifying known root causes and areas of concern can aid in the application of protective layers to actively mitigate (secondary) crisis escalation. Though, to broaden the understanding of ongoing and future risks, further analytical tools such as Bowtie and Resilience Modelling are recommended.

    • The authors would like to thank the Editor, Reviewers, and Editorial Team for their constructive criticism and support.

      • The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

      • Copyright: © 2023 by the author(s). Published by Maximum Academic Press on behalf of Nanjing Tech University. This article is an open access article distributed under Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 4.0), visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
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    Bendiksby HK, Labib A. 2023. Learning from disasters: the 22/7-terrorism in Norway and COVID-19 through a failure modelling lens. Emergency Management Science and Technology 3:7 doi: 10.48130/EMST-2023-0007
    Bendiksby HK, Labib A. 2023. Learning from disasters: the 22/7-terrorism in Norway and COVID-19 through a failure modelling lens. Emergency Management Science and Technology 3:7 doi: 10.48130/EMST-2023-0007

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